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INTRODUCTION
The Lisbon Treaty introduced territorial cohesion as the third dimension of 
the major objective of European policy, besides the social and economic cohe-
sions. The term describes the territorial dimension and serves as a leitmotif 
for the spatial development of the EU, in spite of the absence of formal insti-tutions to enforce it. It is acknowledged that territorial cohesion needs to be 
implemented indirectly, via sectoral policies (Spit & Zoete, 2009, p. 20). Thus, 
European spatial governance depends on the mobilization of coalitions and 
partnerships across the vertical and horizontal levels and governance struc-
tures (Smith, 2007, p. 1020; Heinelt & Lang, 2011). But how could a coalition 
between the European Territorial Cohesion Policy and particular spatially rel-
evant sector policies function?
Contemporary academic discourses on territorial cohesion often fo-
cus on the lacking formal competence of the European Union in spatial plan-
ning (Oosterlynck, 2009; Pallagst, 2006; Vanolo, 2010), the vague or missing 
definition of the term itself, and its function as a leitmotif or planning doc-
trine (Zonneveld & Waterhout, 2005; Battis & Kersten, 2008). Often, the idea 
of vertical and horizontal integration of different spatial policies via territo-
rial cohesion is promoted (Robert et al., 2001; Siehr 2009), although already the 
delimitation of public policy problems is complex and politically loaded (Ves-
elý 2007). But the discourse on territorial cohesion also reveals that European 
policy can achieve such a coordinating function only through a mutual rela-
tionship with spatial policies such as environmental policy, regional policy or transportation policy. In other words, because of the lack of a strong institu-
tional foundation and the term’s vague definition, territorial cohesion crucially depends on coalitions with strong spatial policies.
A theory is missing that explains how such a European policy of territo-
rial cohesion via spatial policies could function. This research study is an at-
tempt to provide such a theory by applying Cultural Theory2. Cultural Theory is 
a social-constructivist theory that is built on the assumption that every social 
2  By Cultural Theory in capital letters, we refer to the work by Mary Douglas, Aaron Wildavsky and 
fellows, as opposed to the more general field of cultural theory.
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ten attributed to Erving Goffman3; Cultural Theory also belongs to theories ac-
knowledging pluralism in social situations, rejecting approaches from the first 
camp. There are parallels: both Cultural Theory and frame analysis put values, beliefs, and perceptions central in the analysis of social situations, instead of 
rejecting them as irrelevant or irrational; also, both regard interpretations of 
the world as dynamic (Benford & Snow, 2000). As opposed to Goffman’s fram-
ing concept which tries to explain or focus on the question where different in-
terpretations (or frames) of the world stem from, Cultural Theory provides a 
simple analytical scheme that allows reducing pluralism to a manageable num-
ber of four. Thus, we are able to analyse pluralism without rejecting it4 (Doug-
las, 1999) and without getting trapped in usual dichotomies (state vs. market, 
top-down vs. bottom-up, macro vs. micro), which often lead to normative dis-
cussions about the preferred option (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 21). Another im-
portant feature of Cultural Theory that differs from frame analysis is that it 
contends that the analytical scheme it provides is an exclusive reduction of plu-
ralism and a generic model that can be applied to every social situation5. In ad-
dition to this analytical aspect, Cultural Theory also offers a conceptual model 
for policy path towards solutions, namely clumsy solutions (see below). So, al-
though frame analysis and Cultural Theory have the same pedigree in social 
constructivism, there are also important differences enabling Cultural Theory 
to provide a substantial contribution to policy solutions of wicked problems 
(Hartmann, 2012). In the following, Cultural Theory shall be outlined in its ba-sic features.
Cultural Theory acknowledges that there are different rational solutions 
to policy problems because stakeholders perceive the world through four dif-
ferent rationalities (Thompson et al., 1990). Thus, it ‘can be used to detect and 
locate actual positions taken in political or policy debate’ (Hendriks, 1999, p. 
428). The anthropologist Mary Douglas is acknowledged to be the founder of 
this theory, and Thompson, Wildavsky, and Ellis are further important support-
ers of this theory; see also Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990; 
Ellis & Thompson, 1997. As mentioned earlier, the theory distinguishes four 
ideal-typical (Hendriks, 1999, p. 428) ‘cultures’ (Ellis & Thompson, 1997) or ‘ra-
tionalities’ (Davy, 2008): hierarchism, individualism, egalitarianism and fatal-
ism. These rationalities represent different ways of ‘organizing’ and perceiving 
social situations (Thompson, 2008, p. 39). It is important to mention that the 
3  There are different strands of the framing approach, but many reach back to a famous book by 
Goffman (1974); Benford and Snow (2000).
4  Mary Douglas (1999) calls the grid and group scheme of Cultural Theory a ‘parsimonious’ model.
5  Herein also lies a frequently criticized aspect of Cultural Theory.
situation can be described in terms of four ideal-typical rationalities: individ-
ualism, egalitarianism, hierarchism, and fatalism. Therefore, it can be used to 
distinguish between existing approaches. Recently, the theory has been further 
developed by Thompson, Ney, Verweij and others with the concept of ‘clumsy 
solutions’ (Ney, 2003; Verweij & Thompson, 2006; Verweij, 2011). It is discussed 
in this contribution how this concept can help developing a comprehensive Eu-ropean policy of territorial cohesion.
The remaining part of this paper consists of three major sections. Section 
2 explains the basic features of Cultural Theory and its categorization of four 
different approaches. The following section sums up the discussion on the in-
stitutional weakness of territorial cohesion and on the definition of the term. 
It concludes with the need to establish coalitions with spatially relevant secto-
ral policies to implement the European policy of territorial cohesion. The third 
section then presents the ideal-typical coalitions of territorial cohesion and 
spatial policies. In this section we also explore theoretically how Cultural Theo-
ry’s concept of clumsy solutions recommends pursuing a comprehensive Euro-
pean Territorial Cohesion Policy. In the Conclusion, research gaps are identified 
to enable future empirical research on this topic.
CULTURAL THEORY
Although Cultural Theory originates from anthropology and has been much 
used in research on risk perception (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983; Renn, 2008; 
Rippl, 2001), its relevance for planning theory has also been proven (Davy, 
1997; Hendriks, 1999; Zwanikken, 2001; Hartmann, 2012).
Why should Cultural Theory be applied to territorial cohesion? Establish-
ing coalitions between policy fields is difficult because of manifold uncertain-
ties, complexities and normative biases (see e.g. Hillier, 2010; Gunder & Hillier, 
2009; Roo, de & Silva 2010), and it has been described as a ‘wicked problem’ 
(Rittel & Webber, 1973; Hartmann, 2012). In social and political science, there 
are two conceptual camps when it comes to solving such wicked issues (Ver-
weij, 2011, p. 35): One camp builds on the assumption that societies function 
on the same or similar premises; the other camp acknowledges pluralism and 
assumes that the complexity of society impedes the development of policy so-
lutions. Proponents of rational choice theory or the homo oeconomicus, typi-
cal of the first camp, approach policy issues in order to find one perfect-fitting 
solution. Frame analysis as a well-known example of the second camp is of-
ARTICLES
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Each rationality is driven by particular expectations about how the world 
reacts to interventions (Hartmann, 2012). The rationalities are best illustrated 
by pictograms showing a ball in a landscape. The ball represents the world; the 
landscape represents the behavioural characteristics of the world following in-
terventions (Thompson et al., 1990, pp. 25–37). Such pictograms depict the four 
rationalities and their perception of the world in a very useful way6, helping 
us understand their differences in perceptions and conceptualizing. The reifi-
cation of the rationalities is used here to simplify the text. Actually, the subject 
that envisions the world in a particular way is a person that acts out the re-
spective rationality in a particular situation. The following brief descriptions of 
the four rationalities are largely derived from Schwarz & Thompson (1990).• Individualism sees the landscape as a valley; the world lies on the bottom 
of this valley. This is a rather robust situation. Accordingly, individuals can 
experiment with the world, and each fault provides also an opportunity. 
There is no inherent need to cooperate or act in a group; self-determina-
tion and individual liberty are the important values. Individualism follows 
a neo-liberal concept of justice and pursues market-based management approaches.• Egalitarianism envisions the world as lying on top of a hill in an unstable 
equilibrium. There is an inherent threat that even a small disturbance will 
destroy the equilibrium irreversibly. From this perspective, it is rational 
not to experiment: there is no scope for failures as they are irreversible 
and have severe consequences. In the grid-and-group scheme, this ration-ality is assigned to a high degree of group and a low degree of grid adhe-
sion. Egalitarianism emphasizes community, and neglects government 
interventions and market schemes.• Hierarchism pictures the world lying in a small dip on top of a hill. This 
is a relatively robust equilibrium. But beyond certain boundaries – beyond 
the dip – the world crashes down and the equilibrium is destroyed. A ra-
tional response to such a world is to set rules and regulations. Hierarchism 
therefore needs strong group adhesion and a strong grid. According to this 
rationality, nested levels of hierarchy are important to maintain the equi-
librium. So, hierarchism is a perspective that regards regulations and rules 
as necessary to govern society and markets.
6  Actually  the  pictograms  originate  from  work  on  visions  of  nature. Thompson  and  colleagues 
added these pictograms in the 1990s to Cultural Theory (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky, 1990). 
Originally, only three such visions existed, and there is a debate among Cultural Theory scholars 
if the fatalistic rationality is actually represented properly with the flat landscape. This, however, 
shall not be discussed here. For further literature on this, the reader is advised to check recent 
publications on Cultural Theory (Ney, 2003; Ney and Verweij, 2010).
theory does not distinguish degrees of rationality, use a dichotomy of rational 
vs. irrational, or rank the four rationalities, but rather considers them equally 
rational. In this way, the four categories help us analyse pluralism (Douglas, 
1999, p. 411) and thus understand the inherently polyrational ways of ‘how in-
stitutions think’ (Douglas, 1986).
Basically, the theory is built on the assumption that every social action can 
be measured on two independent dimensions, ‘grid’ and ‘group’. ‘Grid’ indi-
cates the extent to which a decision maker is bound (actually: binds him/her-
self) to externally imposed structures, rules and prescriptions. Accordingly, a 
high grid stands for heteronymous decision-making; and a weak grid refers to 
a high degree of self-determination. The second dimension is ‘group’. It indi-
cates whether an individual is likely to join a group or prefers to act on their 
own. The higher the group dimension, the more group-bound is the decision 
made (Hartmann, 2012; Thompson et al., 1990). Since the two dimensions are 
independent, they form a diagram with two axes and four quadrants. Each of 
the four rationalities can be located in one quadrant and can be described by a 
combination of the two dimensions, grid and group (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Cultural Theory’s four rationalities
strong group 
strong grid
weak group
weak grid
individualism egalitarianism 
hierarchismfatalism
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needed (Barca, 2009), one that would be less segregated, less sectoral, more in-
tegrated, and better coordinated (Vogelij 2010).
The Treaty of Lisbon formally addresses the need for a territorial strat-
egy by including ‘territorial cohesion’ among its general goals (Art. 3 III TEU). 
Hereby, the territorial dimension complemented the existing aims of economic and social cohesion, and together they generate a triangular goal as the orien-
tation frame for European policies (Ahner & Füchtner, 2010, p. 543).
Since its first official appearance in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and 
increasingly after its definition in primary law (2007), the term has been sub-
ject of innumerable discussions and different definitions (Abrahams 2013). Ac-
ademics, policy-makers and practitioners have been attempting to understand 
what is meant by this vague term. Neither a detailed study of the term’s ori-
gin (Faludi 2009), nor a Green Paper (2008/2009), nor a wide survey on ES-
PON projects (Abrahams 2013) could deliver a common understanding. The 
term fits or does not fit to different cultural contexts and varying geographic 
scales – it is applicable to macro regions and likewise to local surroundings. 
Whether this vagueness is assessed as essentially positive (as it provides some 
flexibility and scope giving a meaning to this term), or whether some it hin-
ders the implementation of territorial cohesion, depends very much on the 
perspective – or rather rationality – of the assessor, as it will become clear later on.
The coalition behind the European Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP, 
1999) and its follow-up document, the Territorial Agenda (TAEU, 2007 & 2011), 
does not provide any further specification of the term. It understands terri-
torial cohesion as a set of principles underpinning multiple objectives: a har-
monious, balanced, efficient, sustainable territorial development (ESDP 1999); 
spatial solidarity; and “convergence between the economies of better-off ter-
ritories and those whose development is lagging behind” (TAEU, 2011, pp. No. 
8). In short, the goal is to enable “equal opportunities for citizens and enter-
prises, wherever they are located, to make the most of their territorial poten-
tials” (TAEU, 2011, pp. No. 8).
It can only be stated that the term outlines a “new, officially agreed policy 
objective for the development of Europe’s territory” (Vogelij 2010, p. 2), and the 
related policy field “is still very much in the making” (Luukkonen & Moilanen, 
2012, p. 428).
Territorial cohesion serves as a leitmotif, offering a direction of thinking, 
but has to be interpreted constantly for each and every situation and context. 
In this sense, it is not different from other concepts of modern management 
and governance processes (Vogelij 2010, p. 2). Even the term spatial planning 
itself has different meanings throughout Europe and includes different ap-
• Finally, fatalism believes in a capricious world. Fatalists do not prefer a 
specific concept of justice, as it is not enforceable in a complex world, and 
instead rely on fate and luck. The perception that we cannot know how the 
world reacts, and we cannot influence events, is depicted by a flat land-
scape in which the world (the ball) lies. It is unpredictable whether it will 
roll to the right or to the left, or whether it is in equilibrium at all. Fatalis-tic rationality is not a rationality of indifference, but a rationality where in-
dividuals do not believe in the controllability of the world. The strong grid 
is externally determined and, owing to the weak group dimension, exerting 
influence on the grid is not possible.
These four rationalities are internally consistent, mutually contradictory 
and jointly exhaustive (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). They comprise a system 
of plausible, rather than empirically demonstrably true rationalities (Dake, 
1992, p. 24). For more detailed elaboration on the theory and the rationalities, 
see also literature on Cultural Theory (Thompson et al., 1990; Davy, 1997; Hart-
mann, 2012).
The European policy of territorial cohesion
This section will elaborate on what territorial cohesion is and how it is pur-
sued. It briefly outlines its origins before addressing the debate on the mean-
ing and the term “territorial cohesion”. It also explains how territorial cohesion 
can be considered as a leitmotif of European spatial development. As such, it is 
shown that the legal basis of territorial cohesion depends very much on its im-
plementation in the member states.
The European Union as a whole can be considered as a spatial policy ex-
periment, composed by projects in different policy fields such as regional, en-
vironmental and social policies (Vogelij 2010, p. 1). These policies determine 
the EU and its territorial boundaries through acts of exclusion and inclusion 
(Vanolo, 2010, p. 1307). These boundaries mirror different perceptions of Eu-
ropean territory and sub-territories (Ritter & Fürst, 2009, p. 13). These are not 
determined by spaces of nature (e.g. rivers, mountains, coastlines), but are 
built on the socially constructed boundaries of common values, policies or eco-
nomic activity (Hengstermann, 2011, p. 200) and take shape in institutional set-
tings (Ekelund 2012). Recently, territorial aspects of European governance have 
been recognized increasingly in what can be labelled as a second ‘spatial turn’ 
(Ritter & Fürst, 2009, p. 13; Schlögel, 2003, pp. 60–71). This goes along with an 
increasing demand for the coordination of European spatially relevant policies 
(Robert et al., 2001, pp. 153, 158; Siehr 2009, pp. 79–80). A place-based policy is 
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cludes a ‘shared competence’ on territorial cohesion (Art. 4 II c TEU). The con-
struction of a shared competence in primary law is not to be understood as 
cooperative task-sharing between the European level and the member state 
level. It equates more to the German principle of ‘concurrent legislation’ (see 
article 72, German constitutional law). In other words, as long as there is no su-
perior legislation for an issue, member states may regulate it on their own (see 
Weber 2012).
Therefore, the EU could assume formal competence in territorial cohesion 
as soon as there is a common understanding and a legally sound definition. 
Based on current debates and varying understandings, any formal entitlement 
for enforcing territorial cohesion as an EU competence can hardly be justified 
(Vanolo, 2010, p. 1303). Thus, the competence for territorial cohesion will re-
main on member state level, and an EU cohesion policy via binding regulations 
is unlikely at the moment (Zonneveld & Waterhout, 2005, p. 25).
Summing up, territorial cohesion is a weak term and a policy area without 
a formal institutional power. It rather functions as a helpful vision for policies 
aiming at an integrated spatial, place-based development of the Union (Barca 
2009). Therefore, sectoral policies must be coordinated (Schäfer, 2005, p. 48). 
The tension between the actual influence of the European Union on territorial 
development via sectoral policies and the lack of a formal competence in spa-
tial planning itself requires some kind of a moral obligation to implement spa-
tial planning (Fürst, 2010, p. 181). Therefore, territorial cohesion needs to add 
tangible added value to spatial policies to be accepted by them as an overall 
leitmotif without legal competence. In this way, the overall goal of territorial 
cohesion can generate actual effects on spatial development and implement 
such development via various policy fields. Pursuing the Lisbon Treaty’s goal depends on building coalitions with spatial policies.
Applying Cultural Theory to European spatial policy
In the following section, the basic features of Cultural Theory are applied to the 
question of how coalitions between the European Territorial Cohesion Policy and spatial policies could function.
Four ideal types of coalitions
According to the previously outlined four rationalities of Cultural Theory, four 
different ideal types of coalitions between the European Territorial Cohesion 
Policy and spatial policies can be designed. These ideal types are an abstraction 
of real coalitions in spatial planning. In line with Weber, the ideal types are de-
proaches to influencing spatial developments (Hillier 2010), which could be a 
reason why the new term of territorial cohesion was created.
Putting aside the quest for a precise definition, the conceptual character-
istics of territorial cohesion appear in three dimensions (Battis and Kersten 
2008, p. 7):• territorial balance,• territorial integration,• territorial governance.
These dimensions frame the concept in order to provide a proper tier of 
European planning, which goes beyond the sum of 28 national planning ap-
proaches (Hengstermann, 2012, p. 51).
Territorial balance represents the normative dimension; it implies that spa-
tial disparities shall be reduced. Territorial cohesion policy is differentiated ac-cording to places and geographical context according to the particular function. 
Such spatial solidarity requires and supports the development of endogenous 
potential in accordance with responsibility for the overall space. This leads to 
a territorial balance that is not meant as homogeneity, but as equal potentials.
The (vertical and horizontal) territorial integration of different sectoral 
policies with spatial impact regards functional spaces irrespective of adminis-
trative and state borders. In doing so, ad-hoc spaces are defined on the basis of 
political challenges and technical, societal and natural tasks. This affects a vari-
ety of places with generally equal opportunities but different spatial potentials.
The third dimension represents the method of operation called territorial 
governance; it corresponds with a multi-level governance approach. Instead of 
central government only, spatial development is governed by a comprehensive 
network across levels and actors (Gualini 2006; Hajer & Wagenaar 2003).
All these basic elements of the concept of territorial cohesion provide a 
leitmotif, a general direction of thinking. Summarizing the debate on the defi-
nition of term territorial cohesion, the term has to be understood as an over-
all guideline to envisioning spatial development at the European policy level 
(Vanolo, 2010, p. 1303; Zonneveld & Waterhout, 2005, p. 25). Without this rather 
vague term, no common approach to spatial policy would be possible due to 
different understandings of planning across Europe. The choice of a new, un-
known term without a precise definition is an attempt to give the essen-
tial leeway to different cultural understandings. Nevertheless, the function as 
a leitmotif restrains a clear, aligned approach; this is why critics question the concept of territorial cohesion categorically.
This understanding is also reflected in the legal basis, which is subject of 
many discussions and fundamental criticism as well. European primary law in-
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Table 1 summarizes the four ideal types of coalitions resulting from pure 
application of the theory to the task of forming coalitions between two or more 
policy fields. The following four approaches to coalitions can be identified:
The first column in Table 1 presents the hierarchic approach. The problem 
of establishing a coalition between the European Territorial Cohesion Policy 
and spatial policies is seen in missing leadership, unclear responsibilities be-
tween the policy fields, and complex institutional arrangements. Consequently, 
the objective of such a rationality is to set up a programme that integrates the 
two fields. This will be achieved by synoptic planning approaches. The result-
ing strategy could be named ‘comprehensive spatial planning’.
The problem with a coalition between the European Territorial Cohesion 
Policy and spatial policies from an individualist perspective is that good ideas 
for collaboration in different policy fields are not rewarded owing to adminis-
trative and institutional barriers. The rational response is to encourage innova-
tive pilot projects that combine policy fields by using, for example, competitive 
project funding.
The egalitarian description sees the problem in a missing focus on the 
greater public interest. It is hindered by lobbying in policy fields and rigid in-
stitutional framing. Hence, what is needed is a common vision of spatial devel-
opment – actually, of Europe. Its methods of choice include participation and 
open collaborative processes. The strategy is built on a common vision which 
leads to a pattern of collective behaviour of many entities. From an egalitar-
ian standpoint, this is the most rational approach to establishing a coali-
tion between policy fields. Such cooperative schemes require fewer top-down 
structures. In fact, they work because of a lack of hierarchy and a strong em-
phasis on collaborative schemes, as for example Healey describes them (Hea-
ley, 2003).
The fatalistic approach sees the emergence of coalitions more or less a 
question of luck and fate as to whether the acting entities occasionally work in 
the same direction. We call this ‘reactive spatial development’. Due to the belief 
in the uncontrollability and complexity of the policy fields, no long-term strat-
egy is advised, but rather coalitions are just ad hoc collaborations that react to 
certain short-term events.
This thought experiment shall show how the pursuit of different ration-
alities results in different coalitions. It is, however, remarkable that there can 
be found empirical indicators of the existence of the four types in literature on strategy building and spatial planning coalitions. In his analysis of regional 
planning in Germany, Wiechmann (2008) brings up four different types of coa-
litions (Wiechmann, 2008, pp. 252–254) without making reference to Cultural 
Theory (so that the argument of a biased empirical research can be rejected). 
signed as generalized and simplified types, leaving out particular features from 
practice and stressing others. The criteria for their design are derived from the 
four rationalities of Cultural Theory. However, the different types of strategies 
that can be identified in the practice of regional development match the four 
abstract ideal types below pretty well (Wiechmann, 2008). Each type is con-
sistent within one rationality, but irrational from the perspective of the other three.
To describe and compare the differences between the four types of coali-
tions, the components ‘problem’, ‘objective’, and ‘method’ are used to charac-
terize them. These three components are derived from Schönwandt and Voigt 
(2005, pp. 770–772). Planning problems are evaluations of current situations 
that are perceived as undesirable or inconvenient by the evaluating subject; 
planning objectives are defined as desirable or more convenient future situa-
tions; and planning methods contain the legal and social rules and norms (in-
stitutions) applied to implement the planning objectives. As Schönwandt and 
Voigt point out, the three components are very much dependent on the ration-
alities of the stakeholders (Schönwandt & Voigt, 2005: 770). Schönwandt and 
Voigt originally referred to ‘background knowledge’, but the term ‘rationality’ 
covers better what is meant: an inherently consistent and logical way of think-
ing (see also Davy, 2008; Hartmann, 2012). So they are suitable for the follow-
ing thought experiment of designing four ideal-typical coalitions.
Table 1 Four types of coalitions
HIERARCHIC:
COMPREHENSIVE 
PLANNING
INDIVIDUALISTIC:
COMPETITION OF 
PROJECTS
EGALITARIAN:
COOPERATIVE 
MANAGEMENT
FATALISTIC:
REACTIVE 
MANAGEMENT
Pr
ob
le
m
Missing 
leadership, unclear 
responsibilities, 
institutional 
diversity
Too few incentives 
for initiatives 
and too many 
administrative 
obstacles
Lobbyism and 
institutionalism 
obstruct the public 
interest
Policy fields are too 
complex and too 
different
O
bj
ec
tiv
e Integrated 
programme on 
territorial cohesion 
and sector policy
Projects that 
combine territorial 
cohesion and sector 
policy
Common vision on 
territorial cohesion 
and sector policy
No particular 
alliance
M
et
ho
d Synoptic planning 
approaches
Tendered 
competition of ideas 
for alliance projects
Participation and 
collaborative 
planning
Ad hoc short-term 
collaboration
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(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 87), it is impossible for one of the rationalities to be 
drowned or superseded permanently (although it can be temporarily less dom-
inant). This has crucial consequences for developing strategies because Cul-
tural Theory presumes that each of the four rationalities has its justification, 
thus none can be rejected as irrational. The four are contradictory, but each has 
its own rational strategy – as illustrated in the previous section. From the point 
of view of the other rationalities, each strategy appears irrational. So the miss-
ing rationalities will most likely reject the prevalent strategy (for a detailed ex-
planation, see Thompson et al., 1990). In short, solutions that do not include all four rationalities cannot persist.
For the field of spatial policymaking, the impossibility theorem has been 
described empirically. Davy’s study on regional cooperation in the Ruhr area 
found that the four rationalities emerge in such situations and explained 
how they frame solutions (Davy, 2004). Hartmann developed a clumsy so-
lution for the field of flood risk management. He explained how the four ra-
tionalities dominate certain situations in floodplains, and how this dominance 
influences the management of these areas (Hartmann, 2011). Establishing a co-
alition between the European Territorial Cohesion Policy and spatial policies 
is not a question of choosing a strategy following one of the four rationalities 
described above, but rather a question of incorporating elements of all four of 
these strategies. However, from the limited perspective of any single rational-
ity, such a polyrational solution can never be perfect, and rather appears a bit 
irrational because of incorporating elements of the other rationalities. Verweij 
and Thompson therefore use the term ‘clumsy solution’ to describe a polyra-
tional solution (Verweij & Thompson, 2006). On a side note, it is important to 
recognize that the term ‘solution’ is in fact misleading. A solution is always a 
response to a problem. Social constructivist approaches (such as Cultural The-
ory), however, acknowledge that the perception of a problem results from in-
terpretation by a certain rationality. The solution does in fact not ‘solve’ a 
problem, but it responds to the plurality of worldviews. So, the inclusion of all 
four rationalities is its strength as well as its weakness. A clumsy solution is al-
ways a dynamic situation where the different rationalities compete to erase the 
clumsiness (the other three rationalities) and make it a perfect solution. This is 
what Thompson and his fellows call ‘permanent dynamic imbalance’ (Thomp-
son, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990, p. 87).
This raises the next obvious question: how could a clumsy strategic ap-
proach to a coalition between territorial cohesion and spatial policy work? 
It needs to combine elements of all four types mentioned before. It is, how-
ever, more than just adding them together. A clumsy strategy must be rational 
enough for each rationality to be accepted by it. The hierarchic element in such 
The first of these four types is called ‘strategic spatial development’. It uses 
synoptic planning approaches based on ‘rational’ analyses as well as strong 
and binding decisions. ‘Project-oriented networking’ is the second type of coa-
litions. It rejects big plans; rather, it prefers projects that achieve local develop-
ments without imposing strict regulations. One can regard this approach as the 
market approach. The third type is ‘cooperative planning’. It focuses on broad 
participation of stakeholders and consensual decision making. This approach 
fits with what is known as collaborative planning in planning theory (Healey, 
2003; Healey, 2009). Voluntary agreements and mutual trust are important ele-
ments. The fourth type is labelled as ‘strategic project management’. It assumes 
that spatial development is not predictable, and so (long term strategic) plan-
ning is the only possible option. The reason is that the entire socio-economic 
system is too complex and has to cope with uncertainty. Such an approach pur-
sues projects without a particular strategic steering mechanism. The sum of a 
project will emerge in a pattern, which can be considered as a strategy ex post. 
Therefore, Wiechmann identifies in his analysis four fundamental and even 
contradictory types of regional planning. ‘Strategic spatial development’ fits hi-
erarchic rationality, ‘project-oriented networking’ almost ideal-typically rep-
resents the ideals of individualist rationality, ‘cooperative planning’ describes exactly how egalitarians would approach regional planning coalitions, and 
‘strategic project management’ is easy to assign to fatalistic rationality. This 
can be regarded as empirical support for the existence of the four types of ra-tionalities in spatial planning.
In summary, four ideal-typical approaches to coalitions can be designed. 
The example of Wiechmann’s empirical research shows that these can even 
be found in practice. The ideal types described above are exaggerated and 
designed according to one of the rationalities each. They are mere analytical 
constructions to benchmark existing practices and categorize approaches to 
coalitions between spatial policies and territorial cohesion. This complicates 
the challenge of establishing coalitions between the European Territorial Cohe-
sion Policy and spatial policies because the four types of coalitions are organ-
ized according to contradictory principles. The question emerges which one is 
to choose, or how to come to a comprehensive European Territorial Cohesion 
Policy. Here, the concept of clumsy solutions can help.
A clumsy solution for territorial cohesion
Cultural Theory not only helps in categorizing the four strategies as described 
and illustrated above, but also postulates that all four rationalities emerge 
in each and every social situation. According to the ‘impossibility theorem’ 
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a clumsy strategy, planners need to put themselves behind a ‘veil of rational-
ity’. They will not know which rationality they adhere to. Therefore, the best 
thing they can do is to make the strategy as rational as possible from all four 
perspectives. What such a clumsy strategy for establishing a coalition will actu-
ally look like and what particular elements it will have depends on the political 
context in which it is developed. This could be a method for designing a clumsy 
strategy for a coalition that is capable of implementing the European Territo-
rial Cohesion Policy. However, there are some discussion points and drawbacks 
with the idea of Cultural Theory, as shall be discussed in the conclusion.
CONCLUSION
It has been shown that the European Territorial Cohesion Policy is a field 
based on a vague term and weak formal competences. In this field, it is a pri-
ori difficult if not impossible to apply traditional planning methods and instru-
ments. Rational argument, efficiency bias, or juridical solutions fail without 
having a reliable definition and strong competences. Therefore, applying Cul-
tural Theory and its clumsy solutions in such a contested and complex policy 
situation might reveal some of its crucial features and constraints. In addition, 
the article focuses on conceptual elements of the Territorial Cohesion Policy.
One of the features of Cultural Theory that comes to the fore is that al-
though the theory derives a logic for clumsy solutions, proposing a clumsy so-
lution in a contested policy field like the Territorial Cohesion Policy is quite 
demanding because a clumsy solution is per definition not totally convincing 
from any of the four rationalities. It is understandable that planners, policy-
makers, and stakeholders strive for perfect solutions. However, Cultural Theo-
ry’s framework of the four rationalities not only provides four different ways of 
designing a solution, but also explains how the respective other solutions will 
be rejected. This is an interesting added value of Cultural Theory. Thereby, the 
Cultural Theory perspective enables typical dichotomies to be extended by a 
third and fourth alternative perspective.
A crucial constraint of Cultural Theory which must not be underestimated 
is that it explicitly stresses normative contradictions between the rationalities 
(and thus between different policy approaches). This social-constructivist ap-
proach helps us better understand the Territorial Cohesion Policy debate by 
discerning the plurality of four rationalities. So, this paper offers not more and 
not less than a debate on the use of another theoretical approach to the Eu-
ropean policy of territorial cohesion. It was not intended to provide empirical 
proof, as this would have curtained the theory. Empirical research on the four 
a clumsy strategy can, for example, be an institutional framework and a plan 
that guides the actions of stakeholders in a desired direction. However, con-
trary to a pure hierarchic strategy, the framework allows some scope, and it 
does not bind all stakeholders. This matches the idea of how the world is con-
stituted: the ball in the landscape (see Figure 1) may roll a bit to the right or 
to the left, as long as it remains in the dip. The individualist element in the 
clumsy strategy is certain project orientation providing opportunities and in-
centives for innovative and experimental projects for collaboration between 
both policy fields. Although the ball will roll a bit uphill towards the edges, the 
long-term result will be the best possible situation – a stable position at the 
bottom of the landscape. Also, an egalitarian element is essential for a clumsy 
strategy. This could indeed be a common vision, which is probably not sophis-
ticated and probably just vague but provides some orientation – as long as it is 
followed, the ball won’t fall. Not all stakeholders will be covered by the hierar-
chic, individualist or egalitarian element. A clumsy strategy also needs to ac-
cept that some unexpected and uncontrollable actions may happen, and deal 
with non-believers. This is the fatalistic element, where the ball and the land-
scape do not exert influence on each other. Finally, a clumsy solution advice for 
setting up a coalition between the European policy field of territorial cohesion 
and spatial policies is to combine such elements of all four rationalities in a vi-
able rather than perfect way. This is why it is called a clumsy solution (as op-
posed to a perfect solution).
Besides this potential benefit in opening one’s thinking about territorial 
cohesion and unveiling the rationalities of the different actors, it cannot be de-
nied that Cultural Theory is constrained by existing normative contradictions. 
Different policy approaches perceive problems by using different normative 
leitmotifs according to different rationalities. Therefore, this social constructiv-
ist approach requires careful treatment, as anyone using Cultural Theory also 
inherently and inevitably can be assigned to one of the rationalities. So, the ad-
vantage of confining pluralism to four rationalities thus can become a threat as 
well, as anyone using Cultural Theory can be blamed for acting out one of the 
rationalities and thus being normatively biased.
Cultural Theory does not offer a method for designing a clumsy solution 
that is able to cope with this dilemma – due to the constraints of the theory it-
self: there is no meta-rationality which one can use to design a clumsy solu-
tion. The planners of a clumsy solution probably need something like a ‘veil of 
rationality’. John Rawls proposes a ‘veil of ignorance’ (Rawls, 2005, c1971) for 
the design of a fair social contract. In short, he suggests that – as a thought ex-
periment – all members of a society discuss and negotiate their society with-
out knowing their later position in society. Applied to our problem of designing 
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rationalities within the policy field is missing as well as approaches to cope 
with the weaknesses of clumsy solutions. It also needs to be verified empiri-
cally if the clumsy solutions discussed here can indeed become real solutions. 
However, this contribution is primarily an attempt to elaborate how Cultural 
Theory can contribute to find such solutions in practice – it is thus a deduc-
tive application of the theory (Cuthbert, 2011). More empirical research like the 
work by Wiechmann (2008) needs to be conducted and interpreted in an in-
ductive way to see if and how there is indeed a match between what the the-
ory predicts and what happens on the ground. Nonetheless, there has been a 
discussion about a theoretical model of integrating territorial cohesion within 
spatial policies – without getting lost in the endless debate about the lack of 
definitions or legally binding competences.
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